Communication Can Destroy Common Learning by Steiner, Jakub & Stewart, Colin
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Communication Can Destroy Common Learning
Citation for published version:
Steiner, J & Stewart, C 2008 'Communication Can Destroy Common Learning' ESE Discussion Papers, no.
184, Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series.
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publisher Rights Statement:
© Steiner, J., & Stewart, C. (2008). Communication Can Destroy Common Learning. (ESE Discussion Papers;
No. 184). Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
  
Edinburgh School of Economics 
Discussion Paper Series 
Number 184 
 
Communication Can Destroy Common 
Learning 
 
 
Jakub Steiner   
Edinburgh University 
 
Colin Stewart 
University of Toronto 
 
 
Date 
September 2008 
 
 
 
 
Published by  
School of Economics 
University of Edinburgh 
30 ‐31 Buccleuch Place 
Edinburgh EH8 9JT 
+44 (0)131 650 8361   
http://edin.ac/16ja6A6 
 
 
 
Communication Can Destroy Common Learning∗
Jakub Steiner†
University of Edinburgh
Colin Stewart‡
University of Toronto
September 6, 2008
Abstract
We show by example that communication can cause common knowledge acquisition to fail.
In the absence of communication, agents acquire approximate common knowledge of some pa-
rameter, but with communication they do not.
1 Introduction
The significance of common knowledge in determining equilibrium outcomes of games has be-
come well established since the seminal work of Lewis (1969). In settings where players acquire
information over time, an important question is whether (approximate) common knowledge of
certain events will eventually be attained. An interesting recent paper by Cripps, Ely, Mailath,
and Samuelson (2008, henceforth CEMS) identifies conditions under which a parameter becomes
common knowledge if agents privately learn the value of the parameter over time. They refer to
common knowledge acquisition as “common learning.”
In addition to private learning, economic agents frequently acquire information through commu-
nication. Intuitively, one might think that introducing communication could only help to achieve
common learning since it improves the information agents have about each other’s knowledge and
beliefs. This intuition is false. We show by example that communication can cause common learn-
ing to fail. Our example exhibits common learning of an underlying parameter if agents do not
communicate, but when communication is introduced according to a particular protocol, com-
mon learning does not occur. Moreover, the failure of common learning is profound; approximate
common knowledge of the parameter fails uniformly across all periods in every state.
∗We thank Friederike Mengel, Stephen Morris, and Jo´zsef Sa´kovics for useful comments and George Mailath and
Larry Samuelson for their encouragement.
†email: jakub.steiner@ed.ac.uk
‡email: colin.stewart@utoronto.ca
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In the example, two agents, 1 and 2, independently observe the value of some underlying
parameter at stochastic times. If the agents do not communicate, then the value of the parameter
becomes approximate common knowledge since each agent eventually assigns high probability to
the other agent having observed the parameter.
In addition to direct observation of the parameter, agents communicate according to the fol-
lowing variant of the Rubinstein (1989) email game. When Agent 1 observes the value of the
parameter, she sends a message to Agent 2, which is privately received following some stochastic
delay. Upon receipt, Agent 2 sends a confirmation message to Agent 1, which is again subject to
stochastic delay. Agent 1 in turn sends a confirmation to Agent 2, and so on. There is no other
communication. All communication is truthful and consists only of each agent (partially) reporting
her own information to the other agent.
Under this communication protocol, common learning of the parameter fails (for some delay
distributions). With communication, if Agent 2 has not received the first message from Agent 1,
it is no longer true that she assigns high probability to Agent 1 having observed the parameter,
even after many periods. Although the unconditional probability that Agent 1 has observed the
parameter becomes high, the probability conditional on the first message not having been received
is bounded away from 1. Therefore, until she receives the first message, Agent 2 faces second-order
uncertainty, that is, uncertainty about Agent 1’s beliefs about the parameter. Since Agent 1 is
uncertain of the time at which this message is received, she faces third-order uncertainty until she
receives Agent 1’s confirmation. Continuing in this fashion, some higher order uncertainty persists
regardless of how many messages have been delivered.
The Rubinstein (1989) email game showed that communication can have a double-edged effect
on common knowledge acquisition. In the email game, Agent 1 observes a parameter, sends a
message informing Agent 2 of the parameter, Agent 2 sends a confirmation message, and so on.
Communication terminates at each step with some small fixed probability. On the one hand,
communication enhances knowledge acquisition; without it, Agent 2 never learns the value of the
parameter. Furthermore, as discussed by Rubinstein, if communication is restricted to a fixed
number of messages, beliefs approach common knowledge with high probability as the likelihood
of delivery failure vanishes. On the other hand, when the number of messages is unbounded,
approximate common knowledge of the parameter is never acquired. Our example differs from
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the original email game in two significant respects. First, common knowledge is attained without
communication, and thus communication only hinders common learning. Second, in our example,
every finite order of interactive knowledge of the parameter is eventually acquired with probability
1, whereas in the email game knowledge is almost surely acquired only to some finite order.
Our example fits into the framework of CEMS when there is no communication. CEMS assume
that each agent learns about the underlying parameter through an infinite sequence of signals that
are i.i.d. across time conditional on the parameter. They prove that if the signal spaces are finite
then individual learning of the parameter implies common learning. The addition of communication
in our example can be viewed as a relaxation of the i.i.d. assumption. Communication naturally
generates dependence in signal profiles across time since any informative message received by an
agent depends on the information possessed by the sender at the time the message was sent.
2 The Example
Two agents, 1 and 2, learn about a parameter θ in periods t = 0, 1, . . .. The parameter θ is drawn
before period 0 from the set Θ = {θ1, θ2} according to the prior distribution p(θ1) = p(θ2) =
1/2, and remains fixed over time. In each period t, each agent i receives a signal zit ∈ Zi =
{θ1, θ2, u}. Conditional on θ, these signals are i.i.d. across time and agents. Signals are generated
with probabilities Pr(zit = θk | θk) = λ and Pr(zit = u | θk) = 1− λ for each k = 1, 2 and some fixed
λ ∈ (0, 1). Note that after receiving signal zit = θk, Agent i knows that the parameter is θ = θk. If
zis = θ for some s ≤ t, we will say that Agent i has observed θ by t. Also note that the signal u
carries no information about the value of θ, and hence, absent communication, agents beliefs about
θ remain equal to their prior beliefs until they observe θ.
Our main purpose is to understand whether approximate common knowledge of the parameter
θ will eventually be acquired by the two agents. Accordingly, following CEMS, we say that Θ is
commonly learned if for each θ ∈ Θ and q ∈ (0, 1), there exists some T such that for all t > T ,
Pr (θ is common q-belief at t | θ) > q,
where common q-belief is as defined by Monderer and Samet (1989).
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It easy to show that in the absence of communication, Θ is commonly learned in our setting.1
Consider the event F that θ = θk and both agents have observed θ by time t. At any state in
F , each agent assigns probability 1 − (1 − λ)t+1 at time t to the other agent having observed θ.
Conditional on θk, the event F occurs with probability
(
1− (1− λ)t+1)2. Choosing T large enough
so that q <
(
1− (1− λ)T+1)2, θk is common q-belief on the event F , which occurs with probability
greater than q conditional on θk.
We now enrich the example by adding communication according to the following protocol. In
each period t, each agent i privately observes a message mit ∈ Mi = {c, s}, representing “confir-
mation” and “silence” respectively. The messages mit are determined by the following stochastic
process. As soon as Agent 1 first observes θ in some period t0, she sends the message c to Agent 2.
This message is received by Agent 2 at some date t1 > t0 according to the distribution described
below. At time t1, Agent 2 sends a message c which is received by Agent 1 at some time t2 > t1.
At time t2, Agent 1 again sends a message c received by Agent 2 at time t3 > t2, and so on. In
every period t 6= tk for k odd, Agent 2 receives the message s, and similarly Agent 1 receives the
message s in every period t 6= tk for k ≥ 2 even.2
The distribution of delivery times is determined as follows. With probability 1/2, there is odd
delay, otherwise there is even delay. With odd delay, each message c from Agent 1 is received by
Agent 2 with stochastic delay according to a geometric distribution with parameter δ ∈ (λ, 1); that
is, given tk with k even, tk+1 − tk is distributed on the set {1, 2, . . .} according to Pr(tk+1 − tk =
d) = δ(1 − δ)d−1. Each message c from Agent 2 is received by Agent 1 exactly one period later;
that is, tk+1 − tk = 1 for all odd k. Even delay is identical to odd delay except with the roles of
the two agents reversed.
Letting M =M1 ×M2 and Z = Z1 × Z2, the set of states is given by Θ × Z∞ ×M∞. The
information of Agent i at time t is captured by the natural projection of Θ × Z∞ ×M∞ onto
Zt+1i ×Mt+1i . We will write hit(ω) ∈ Zt+1i ×Mt+1i for the private history of Agent i at time t in
state ω. We abuse notation by writing θ for the event {θ} × Z∞ ×M∞.
As above, we will write t0(ω), or simply t0 when the state is clear, for the time at which Agent
1 first observes the parameter. For k ≥ 1, we will write tk(ω), or simply tk, for the time at which
1This result also follows immediately from either Proposition 2 or Proposition 3 of CEMS.
2The main result would be unchanged if the agents similarly exchanged messages beginning with Agent 2’s obser-
vation of θ. We focus on the asymmetric version to keep the notation and analysis simple.
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the kth confirmation message is received. Formally, let t0 = min{t | z1t = θ} and for k ≥ 1, define
tk recursively by tk = min{t > tk−1 | mit = c for i = 1 or 2}.
The following result indicates that communication can destroy common learning.
Proposition 1. In the example with communication, there exists some q ∈ (0, 1) such that, for
each θ ∈ Θ, θ is not common q-belief at any t in any state of the world. In particular, common
learning does not occur.
Before proving the proposition, we introduce some additional notation and a key lemma. For
integers k, t ≥ 0, let
Mkt = {ω : tk(ω) ≤ t and tk+1(ω) > t} .
Thus Mkt consists of those states in which, by time t, Agent 1 has observed θ and exactly k
confirmation messages have been received. Similarly, let M−1t denote the event that, by time t,
Agent 1 has not observed θ; formally,
M−1t = {ω : t0(ω) > t} .
Lemma 1. There exists some p > 0 such that, for each t ≥ 0 and k = 0, . . . , t, given any ω ∈Mkt ,
Pr
(
Mk−1t | hit(ω)
)
≥ p for some i ∈ {1, 2}.
For k ≥ 1, Lemma 1 states that if exactly k confirmation messages have been received by t then
one of the agents assigns probability at least p to only k − 1 confirmation messages having been
received. For k = 0, the lemma states that if Agent 2 has not received a confirmation message by
t then she assigns probability at least p to Agent 1 not having observed θ. The proof of Lemma 1
is in the appendix.
Proof of Proposition 1. Choose any q ∈ (12 , 1) such that q > 1− p, with p as in Lemma 1. Suppose
for contradiction that θ is common q-belief at time t in some state ω. By the characterization
of Monderer and Samet (1989), there exists an event F containing ω such that, at time t, F is
q-evident and both agents q-believe θ on F .
We will show that F contains a state in M−1t , i.e. one in which Agent 1 has not observed θ by
time t. In such a state, Agent 1 assigns probability 1/2 to the event θ′ for θ′ 6= θ. Since q > 1/2,
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these beliefs violate the hypothesis that both agents q-believe θ on F at time t, giving the desired
contradiction.
Let k∗ = min
{
k | F ∩Mkt 6= ∅
}
and choose some ω′ ∈ F ∩Mk∗t . We will show that k∗ = −1.
Suppose for contradiction that k∗ ≥ 0. By Lemma 1, for some i, Agent i assigns probability at
least p to the event Mk
∗−1
t at the private history h
i
t(ω
′). Writing Bip(E) for the event that Agent i
p-believes the event E at time t, we have
ω′ ∈ Bip
(
Mk
∗−1
t
)
.
Since F is q-evident at time t, we also have
ω′ ∈ Biq(F ).
By the choice of q, p+q > 1 and hence Mk
∗−1
t ∩F 6= ∅, contradicting the definition of k∗. Therefore,
k∗ = −1.
3 Discussion
The key to the example is that the possibility of delay generates persistent higher order uncertainty
regarding whether Agent 1 has observed the parameter even though the unconditional probability
of this event tends to 1 over time. This persistent uncertainty does not arise if, instead of delay,
each message fails to be delivered with some positive probability (as in the original email game).
In this case, common learning turns out to occur because if Agent 2 does not receive the first
message from Agent 1, then after many periods Agent 2 assigns high probability to the event that
Agent 1 observed the parameter but her message was not delivered. Similarly, a simpler alternative
to our example would be to suppose that each agent’s messages can be delayed in each round of
communication.3 However, common learning occurs under this alternative formulation. One can
show that conditional on not having received a confirmation of the last message she sent, an agent’s
belief that her last message has been received tends to 1 over time. This feature suffices to generate
3Morris (2001) studies this form of communication in a finite horizon continuous time setting without private
learning. Common learning again depends on whether the receipt of the first message becomes common knowledge,
which fails more easily with a finite horizon.
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common learning since, for any q ∈ (0, 1), the event that the message was received eventually
becomes q-evident. In our example, the agents’ uncertainty about the delay distributions prevents
this convergence of beliefs. In every state, each agent assigns significant probability to the event
that the other agent’s messages are delivered without delay. This feature implies that after not
receiving a confirmation for any number of periods, an agent assigns significant probability to the
other agent not having received her last message. Because Agent 2 only assigns high probability
to Agent 1 having observed θ once the first message is received, common learning unravels.
For common learning to fail in our example, it was necessary to assume that δ > λ, so that
delays in communication tend to be shorter than delays in agents’ observation of θ. Otherwise,
if after many periods Agent 2 has not received the first message from Agent 1, then she assigns
high probability to Agent 1 having observed θ but the message having been delayed. Paradoxically,
lowering δ below λ can rescue common learning even though doing so makes communication worse
in the sense that message delays tend to be longer.
Questions about the influence of communication on common knowledge acquisition are related
to a larger literature on the emergence of consensus with communication. A consensus is said
to emerge about an event E if all agents eventually have the same belief about E. Heifetz (1996)
showed that, as suggested by Parikh and Krasucki (1990), consensus can emerge in dynamic settings
without ever becoming common knowledge. Koessler (2001) proved that, although consensus may
emerge, full common knowledge of an event is never attained under any noisy and non-public
communication protocol unless the event was common knowledge initially.4 We diverge from this
literature by combining communication with the individual learning of CEMS. Consensus about
θ almost surely emerges in our example with or without communication. Unlike the previous
literature, however, common learning of θ fails only with communication.
It is easy to construct examples in which communication enables common learning, that is,
in which common learning occurs with communication but fails without it. This would be the
case, for instance, if only one agent privately learns the parameter, and communication consists of
that agent publicly announcing each of her signals. That communication can also cause common
learning to fail raises interesting questions about the role of communication in common knowledge
acquisition and the conditions under which it enhances or hinders common learning. We plan to
4See also Halpern and Moses (1990), who obtained a similar result when messages have unbounded delivery times.
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pursue these questions in future research.
A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Let O and E denote the events that there is odd or even delay respectively, that
is, letO = {ω | tk+1(ω)− tk(ω) = 1 for all k odd}, and E = {ω | tk+1(ω)− tk(ω) = 1 for all k even}.
We begin by calculating each agent’s beliefs over O and E after any finite history, beginning with
Agent 2.
Fix t > 0. Since O and E are equally likely ex ante,
Pr (E | t1 = t) = Pr (t1 = t | E)Pr (t1 = t | E) + Pr (t1 = t | O) . (1)
We have
Pr (t1 = t | E) = λ(1− λ)t−1 (2)
and
Pr (t1 = t | O) =
t−1∑
s=0
λ(1− λ)sδ(1− δ)t−s−1
= δλ
(1− λ)t − (1− δ)t
δ − λ . (3)
Substituting equations (2) and (3) into equation (1) gives
Pr (E | t1 = t) =
(
1 +
δ(1− λ)
δ − λ
(
1−
(
1− δ
1− λ
)t))−1
. (4)
Since δ > λ by construction, this last expression is decreasing in t and approaches δ−λ2δ−δλ−λ > 0 as
t tends to infinity.
Note that, in any state ω, Agent 2 assigns probability Pr (E | t1(ω) = t) to E at any time
t′ ≥ t1(ω) since the distribution of all subsequent messages received by Agent 2 is independent of
O or E. Similarly, Agent 1 assigns probability 12 to O after any finite history. Let σ1 denote Agent
1’s belief in O and σ2 denote Agent 2’s belief in E, suppressing from the notation the dependence
of σ2 on the history.
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Next we compute Agent i’s belief that her most recent message has been received. For any
k ≥ 1, consider the event Mkt that k confirmation messages have been received by time t. Let i be
the sender of the kth confirmation message, that is i = 1 for k odd and i = 2 for k even. Fix any
state ω ∈Mkt , and let d = t− tk−1 be the length of time that has passed since Agent i sent her last
confirmation message. Note that d > 0. We have (given σi)
Pr
(
Mk−1t | hit(ω)
)
=
σi(1− δ)d
(1− σi)(1− δ)d−1 + σiδ(1− δ)d−1 + σi(1− δ)d = σi(1− δ). (5)
Since σi is bounded away from 0, there exists some p1 > 0 such that
Pr
(
Mk−1t | hit(ω)
)
≥ p1.
Finally, consider Agent 2’s belief of whether Agent 1 has observed θ if she has not yet received
a confirmation message at time t ≥ 0. For any ω ∈M0t , we have
Pr
(
M−1t | h2t (ω)
)
=
(1− λ)t+1
(1− λ)t+1 + λ(1− λ)t + 12
∑t−1
s=0 λ(1− λ)s(1− δ)t−s
=
δ − λ
1− 1−δ1−λ + 12λ 1−δ1−λ
(
1−
(
1−δ
1−λ
)t) , (6)
which is decreasing in t and approaches 2(δ−λ)(1−λ)2δ−λ−δλ > 0 as t tends to infinity.
Taking p = min
{
p1,
2(δ−λ)(1−λ)
2δ−λ−δλ
}
gives the result.
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